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Abstract
This paper examines the in°ationary consequences of a currency
changeover in a simple model of the catering market. It suggests
the hypothesis that the change in cash denomination may act as
a coordination device shifting the industry to a high-price equilib-
rium. Empirical evidence on the changeover to the euro based on
data from the Michelin Red Guide strongly supports the predictions
of the model against competing explanations. A permanent change
in relative prices has taken place in Euroland, with redistributional
e®ects in favour of some segments of the catering sector.
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11 Introduction
The introduction of the Euro notes and coins on 1st January 2002 to replace
national currencies has sparked o® an intense debate on the economic conse-
quences of the changeover. According to a conventional view, the change of
currency should not have had any e®ects on relative prices, since money is
simply a \veil". The main direct consequence of the changeover should have
been the reduction in transaction costs associated to a variety of currencies
in the European Union. The adoption of a common currency among a large
number of European countries generates economies of scale and promotes
a greater degree of e±ciency in production. The reduction in price uncer-
tainty would increase welfare through the improvements in the allocation of
resources. Increased transparency of prices would also enhance competition
both across and within countries. Of course, all these bene¯ts would be
greater the closer the member countries were to satisfying the requirements
for an optimal currency area.
On the other hand, a much feared cost in the public opinion, often re-
ported by the media, was the perception of generalized price in°ation trig-
gered by the currency changeover. Price increases in restaurants and in the
service sector have indeed taken place following the introduction of the Euro.
These increases have mainly been attributed to the dynamics of costs in the
food sector due to inclement weather conditions (European Central Bank
[March 2002] pp. 31-32; European Central Bank [April 2002], p. 19). It has
been argued that \the extent of the cash changeover e®ect has been relatively
limited, and should be temporary" (European Central Bank [July 2002] p.
22).
Although price increases might have been una tantum with no substantial
e®ect on the in°ation rate, the change in relative prices may however have
been permanent. This paper provides support for the layman's view that the
changeover resulted in a permanent change in relative prices, and will have
signi¯cant and long-lasting allocative and distributional e®ects. The switch
from national currencies to the Euro has acted as a device that has led ¯rms to
co-ordinate their expectations on pricing behaviour. The exogenous change in
cash denomination has thus shifted the industry to a higher-price equilibrium.
In other words, the widespread concerns about possible generalized price
increases in these industries associated with the introduction of the new
currency have generated self-ful¯lling in°ationary expectations.
We analyse the issue of the in°ationary consequences of a currency
changeover by focusing on the catering market. The market for restaurant
services is ideally suited to our purposes due to its characteristics of segmenta-
tion and imperfect information. We develop a simple model where customers
2have heterogeneous information sets. There are informed agents (Locals) who
know the quality of individual restaurants and uninformed agents (Tourists)
who do not. Restaurants choose whether to specialize in dealing only with a
single type of customer or to attract both types. The equilibrium strategy of
a restaurant depends on its quality and on its potential to attract tourists.
Low quality restaurants and restaurants located in tourist areas are more
tempted to set a price that leaves negative surplus to their customers, ex-
ploiting the imperfect information of tourists. This is traded o® by the cost
of losing potential local customers.
The relationship between expected and current price may exhibit multi-
ple equilibria. Agents will co-ordinate on a given equilibrium according to
their expectations about the strategy restaurants will select and the price at
which tourists will accept to trade. Also, the model predicts that restaurants
adopting di®erent strategies will react with di®erent responses to a shift from
a low price equilibrium to a high price equilibrium. Such predictions allow us
to test the validity of our explanation by focusing on the interactions between
the structure of the market and price expectations.
Our approach enables us to verify our interpretation relative to alterna-
tive suggested explanations, such as: (i) increase in food costs due to bad
weather, (ii) delayed and overdue adjustments of menus, or (iii) rounding-up
of prices in the new currency. By looking at restaurants both inside and out-
side the Euro area, we can only test the validity of our predictions against
(i). However, by also exploiting the heterogeneity in the determinants of
restaurants' equilibrium strategies we are able to discriminate between our
model and all the competing explanations. The model predicts that price in-
creases will mainly occur among the restaurants that specialize in attracting
tourists. This enables us to reject explanations based on (i)-(iii), that would
instead apply to all restaurants in the euro area.
Our empirical results are based on data from the Michelin Red Guide
which has the merit to provide information about the quality and the poten-
tial for attracting tourists of each restaurant. On the other hand, restaurants
included by the guide are selected on the basis of the price-quality combina-
tion o®ered to their customers. This suggests that our results might under-
estimate the real impact of the changeover. Despite this conservative sample
selection our results strongly support our expectation-driven view of price in-
°ation following the changeover, against all competing alternatives. Hence,
a permanent change in relative prices has occurred with the introduction of
the Euro, with clear redistributional consequences.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical
model of the catering market. Section 3 discusses the in°ationary e®ects of
a currency changeover. Section 4 presents our econometric results. Section
35 concludes.
2 The Model
We develop a model of the catering sector based on imperfect information
and market segmentation. We assume that restaurants attract two types of
customers endowed with di®erent information sets: regular customers who
know the quality of a restaurant in advance (\Locals") and all other cus-
tomers (\Tourists"). Restaurants di®er both in the quality of their meals
and in the probability to be visited by tourists. Establishments situated in
more strategic locations are likely to attract more tourists than local cus-
tomers.1
Quality is an exogenous characteristic of restaurants. These also di®er
in their capacity to be matched with uninformed customers. Our focus is
on how restaurants' choice of whether to rip o® or to be \honest" depends
on the likelihood to be matched with uninformed consumers and on reser-
vation prices. We show how strategic interactions between restaurants and
customers eventually lead to multiple equilibria.
We treat quality as an \experience" characteristic of the good (Nelson
[1970]; Cooper and Ross [1984]). This implies that quality can be discovered
only after consuming the good. Chan and Leland [1982] consider the problem
of \search goods" (i.e. those goods where quality can be observed after
bearing some information cost). Real world goods usually fall in between
these two categories. Despite tourists being able to obtain some information
on the quality of a restaurant, for instance by purchasing a tourist guide,
the restaurant example resembles more the case of an experience good (von
Ungern-Sternberg and von Weizsacker [1985]). The rationale for the private
information of the Locals in our model thus comes from the assumption that
they have \experienced" every restaurant at some point in time in the past,
whereas tourists have not.
Restaurants and customers are matched through an exogenous Poisson
process. The use of stochastic matching captures typical departures of the
catering sector from competitive markets such as the presence of monopolistic
rents, price setting sellers and barriers related to the free entry of new ¯rms
in the presence of equilibrium pro¯ts.
1Models with informed and uninformed consumers have been widely considered in the
literature since Salop and Stiglitz [1977]; agents bear di®erent costs in gathering informa-
tion about prices while quality is not an issue. Cooper and Ross [1984] consider a model
with heterogenous information where the entry of ¯rms selling low quality goods at high
price (ripo®s) may cause the uninformed consumers to exit the market.
4At each point in time, a new cohort of Tourists of size ° arrives in town.
Tourists remain in town until the match with the ¯rst restaurant occurs.
We assume that each Tourist departs after the ¯rst match. There is also a
constant unit mass of in¯nitely lived Locals.
Both customer-types want to maximise their surplus:
U(xj) = v(xj) ¡ p (1)
where p is price and v(xj) is the utility associated with a meal of quality xj,
j 2 fL;M;Hg. Locals can exploit private information in the sense that they
always know in advance the quality of a given restaurant whereas Tourists
learn it only after the meal. When a match occurs, the restaurant makes the
customer a take it or leave it o®er about the price of the meal. Thus, there
is no bargaining or, put di®erently, the restaurant has all the bargaining
power. We assume that the restaurant is not able to discriminate between
locals and tourists (for instance, because it is required to display a menu
before the meal).
When the o®er is made, the customer can decide whether to accept it or
decline it. Thus, whenever v(xj) ¸ p the local will accept the o®er.
The tourist does not know the quality in advance and, therefore, he must
rely on expectations. His ex-ante utility is E(v(xj)jIT) ¡ p if he accepts and
0 if he refuses (IT is his information set).
Restaurants are heterogenous in two characteristics: they are di®erent in
quality and in the probability to be spotted by tourists. The idea is that while
locals can be assumed to spread evenly across all the restaurants in the town,
Tourists are likely to ¯nd some places more easily than others. For instance,
an airport restaurant is likely to attract more tourists than a restaurant in an
industrial area. Let ¸i be the Poisson arrival rate of tourists for restaurant
i. We assume that ¸i 2 [¸;¸] is uniformly distributed. The arrival rate of
Locals ¸ is instead assumed to be constant across all the restaurants. In
order to have constant population we assume ° = ¸ ¡ ¸. This implies that
the population size of Tourists is equal to 1 at any point in time.
Restaurants are also di®erent in quality. There are top quality xH,
medium quality xM and low quality xL restaurants. De¯ning X ´ fxH;xM;xLg,
the space of restaurants is given by ­ = X £[¸;¸]. Producing meals is costly
and the unit cost depends on quality: c(xL) < c(xM) < c(xH).
2.1 Pricing Strategies
Since the restaurant cannot discriminate, per customer pro¯ts in the case of
a Local must be the same as in the case of a Tourist. The only di®erence
5is under which conditions a Local or a Tourist will accept the o®er. More
precisely, a local will accept it only if the price does not exceed his reservation
price p¤
L(xj) = v(xj) whereas a tourist will accept it only if p · E(v(xj)jIT)
which implies a reservation price p¤
T = E(v(xj)jIT). Given the Poisson nature
of the process, a restaurant with per customer pro¯ts ¼, arrival rate of tourists



























where ± is the discount rate. In order to get both Locals and Tourists a restau-
rant of quality xj should set a price p = min[p¤
T;p¤
L(xj)]. Therefore, pro¯ts
per customer are ¼ = min[v(xj);p¤
T]¡c(xj). On the other hand, a restaurant
could ¯nd it optimal to set a price that is capable to capture only Locals
or only Tourists. Let sPR;sRT;sRR be the strategies of restaurants dealing,
respectively, with both Locals and Tourists, only with Tourists and only with
Locals. For mnemonic purposes, let us call the types of restaurants associ-
ated with three strategies respectively: Popular Restaurants (PR), Restau-
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(v(xj) ¡ c(xj)); p
¤
T < v(xj) (5)
Whenever a restaurant sets a price that is the minimum between the two
reservation prices it sells to both groups. When instead it sets the maximum
of the pair it only gets one group. Note that RR leave zero surplus to their
customers. This is a consequence of the information rent they enjoy and
of the assumptions on bargaining power. Since all their customers (Locals)
know their quality, and RR know they know, this type of restaurants is able
to appropriate all consumers' surplus.
6Let us now compare the pro¯ts under the di®erent strategies. In order
to assess which is the optimal strategy, restaurants use their expectation on
the Tourist's average reservation price p¤
T:






j ; if v(xj) < p
¤
T
and c(xj) · p
¤
T (6)
for j = L; H; M. This says that when v(xj) < p¤
T there exists a cut-o® value
¸RT
j for ¸i above which the restaurants will choose to neglect the Locals and
only work with Tourists. In general, if v(xj) ¡ c(xj) is roughly constant or
increasing in the quality, then the cut-o® will be increasing in the restaurant's
quality.
Proposition 1. If pro¯ts per costumer v(xj)¡c(xj) are not sharply decreas-
ing in xj then low quality restaurants are more likely to become restaurants
for tourists than other restaurants.
It is useful to note that p¤
T 2 [c(xL);v(xH)) and, therefore, for expecta-
tions to be consistent we also require p¤
T 2 [c(xL);v(xH)).
We can now show that a Tourist su®ers an ex-post loss when he goes to
a Restaurant for Tourists.
Lemma 1. A Tourist matched with a RT he experiences a negative surplus.
Proof. Suppose he were not, then Locals would also go to the RT. But then
the restaurant would no longer be a RT.
A restaurant could also decide to become a Restaurant for Regulars. In
this case it would set a price which is equal to v(xj) > p¤
T and deal only with
Locals thereby extracting all their surplus. It is straightforward to show that
if a restaurant prefers the RT strategy to the PR strategy, then it also prefers
to be a PR rather than a RR. Consider the choice between being a Popular
Restaurant and a RR:






j ; if v(xj) > p
¤
T
and c(xj) · v(xj) (7)
for j = fL; M; Hg. A restaurant i of quality j will become a restaurant for
regulars if ¸i · ¸PR
j .
Proposition 2. If pro¯ts for costumer v(xj)¡c(xj) are not sharply decreas-
ing in quality xj then top quality restaurants have more incentives to become
restaurants for regulars.
7Popular Restaurants must charge a price that is not above the utility
associated with their quality in order to attract both categories of customers.
Thus, when both tourists and regulars are matched with a popular restaurant,
they experience a non-negative surplus.
3 Currency Changeovers and Sectoral Prices
In this section we discuss the possibility of multiple equilibria and its con-
sequences on prices. The individual tourist's payo® is a®ected both by the
behaviour of the mass of tourists and by restaurants' strategies. If restau-
rants expect low reservation prices, the average quality of restaurants which
¯nd it optimal to deal with tourists is also low. Thus, Tourists' willingness
to pay turns out to be low as well in a self-ful¯lling fashion. On the other
hand, if expectations are revised upward, the economy could jump to an
equilibrium with high prices.
3.1 Equilibria
Assume that a Tourist can compute the average reservation price of the
other Tourists and let g(p¤











In the equilibrium, both the restaurateur and the individual tourist per-
fectly predict the tourists' average reservation price.
It is clear from the previous section that the expected quality is strongly
discontinuous in the average reservation price. The strategy chosen by a
restaurant of quality j crucially depends on whether p¤
T Q v(xj). A tax-
onomic analysis of the possible equilibria is contained in Appendix. We
show there how the function g(p¤
T) is characterised both by non-linearity
and discontinuities which may generate multiple equilibria. The reason is
the strategic interaction between the single Tourist, the mass of tourists and
restaurants. The mass of Tourists a®ects the single Tourist's payo® by in-
°uencing the pricing strategy of restaurants. When restaurants expect a low
reservation price p¤
T, the average quality of restaurants willing to deal with
Tourists is low. In fact, top quality restaurants have little incentive to charge
a price capable to attract uninformed costumers. This, in turn, implies that
Tourists, predicting such behaviour, will actually have a low reservation price.
On the other hand, when expectations of high reservation price prevail, the
8equilibrium price will be high as well. It is important to note that a shift may
occur without any change of aggregate quality in the economy. An example
with two equilibria is reported in Fig. 1.
A characteristic feature of the equilibria in this model is:
Proposition 3. A simultaneous and coordinated revision in expectations of
the tourists' reservation price may cause the price to jump from an equilib-
rium to another one.
In the event of a jump from a low price to a high price equilibrium,




T be two possible equilibrium prices. At some point in time t0
the economy is in p0
T. Assume that at time t1 expectations are revised and
the average reservation price jumps from p0
T to p1
T. Restaurants for Tourists
will always charge the higher price p1
T. Popular restaurants will decide to
charge p1
T as well. Other popular restaurants will increase their prices if p0
T
was lower than the locals' reservation price and will leave prices unchanged
otherwise. In addition, some restaurants which were charging v(xj) > p0
T
will ¯nd it pro¯table to charge the new price p1
T < v(xj), reducing thus
their prices. Other restaurants for regulars will leave prices unchanged. The
overall e®ect on the mass of popular restaurants after the jump is ambiguous.
Thus, an important implication of this model is:
Proposition 4. In the presence of a jump from a low to a high price equi-
librium, restaurants will behave di®erently according to their strategies. In
particular:
1. RT will increase their prices.
2. some PR will increase their prices, some will leave them unchanged,
some will reduce their prices.
3. RR will leave prices unchanged.
We conjecture that the introduction of the Euro may have worked as a
coordination mechanism that allowed a switch from a low-price to a high-
price equilibrium. The media may have played an important role in a®ecting
expectations. Before the introduction, the main issue was the rounding up
of prices converted in Euros from prices expressed in national currencies2.
2A brief summary of the events leading to the introduction of the euro. In December
1998 ¯xed exchange rates between euro and national currencies were announced by the
9As soon as the euro replaced the old national currencies, consumers' associa-
tions and research institutions started to express concerns that sellers might
increase their prices, exploiting consumers' di±culties in the conversion. The
media massively covered such stories. This process may have worked as a
device to coordinate expectations toward a high price equilibrium. Proposi-
tion 4 shows that Restaurants for Tourists are likely to increase their prices
when faced with such scenario. On the other hand, it is possible to argue
that conversion di±culties are the same for both Locals and Tourists. By
contrast, Locals are often regular customers. This implies that they are more
likely to remember old prices - and compare them with the new prices after
the conversion - than Tourists. Thus, restaurants dealing with Locals must
necessarily be more cautious than other restaurants in raising their prices.
The model predicts that Locals will accept an increase in price as long as
they continue to experience a positive surplus which can be assessed ex ante,
since they know the quality. By contrast, tourists have much more di±cul-
ties to compare old prices with new ones, even when they have no problems
with the conversion calculations. They also cannot rely on accurate knowl-
edge about quality. Both these sources of imperfect information make their
choice problematic. In other words, the daily warnings about price increases
due to \di±culties in converting" may have triggered a shift to a high price
equilibrium through a self-ful¯lling mechanism.
We test the empirical implications of the model in the next section.
4 Evidence
4.1 Data Description
We collect data from the Michelin Guide [2002 and 2003 editions] (\Main
Cities of Europe") for six countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Swe-
den and UK. All the six countries are long-standing members of the Eu-
ropean Union. France, Germany, and Italy have adopted the EURO as a
new national currency since 2002. Denmark, Sweden, and UK retained their
national currencies. We consider restaurants for which observations are avail-
able for both the 2002 and 2003 editions. Despite euro notes having been
introduced since January 2002, the 2002-2003 period is the most appropri-
national central banks of the twelve countries joining the euro. Starting from January
1999, the euro became the o±cial currency in these countries, although no notes were
issued in euros. Since January 2002 notes in national currency started to be replaced
by notes in euros. The replacement process was completed on di®erent dates across the
twelve countries.
10ate to capture the e®ect of the changeover on prices for two reasons. First,
the guide is published by the end of March each year and some countries
experienced a double currency regime for the ¯rst months of 2002. Secondly,
during 2002 some local authorities have kept prices under strict monitoring
in order to avoid unfair rounding up.
We use the following dummies: EURO (which takes value 1 when the
restaurant is in the euro area), RT (which takes value 1 if the restaurant
is classi¯ed as a Restaurant for Tourists), PR (which takes value 1 if the
restaurant is classi¯ed as a popular restaurant), RR (which takes value 1 if
the restaurant is classi¯ed as for regular customers).
As noted in section 2, the determinants of a restaurant's strategy are:
a) its capacity to attract Tourists (¸i), b) its quality (xi;j), and c) the ex-
pected equilibrium price (p¤
T); a) and b) can be considered as exogenous
in the short run while c) is clearly endogenous. The dummy variables are
meant to capture the heterogeneity in the arrival rates. In order to classify
restaurants, we use the description in the guide. Restaurants classi¯ed as
Restaurants for Tourists must satisfy at least one of the following conditions:
a) restaurants for which the description explicitly states their customers are
mainly tourists, b) restaurants located in particular tourist areas, c) restau-
rants with a particular view, d) hotel restaurants. Restaurants classi¯ed as
restaurants for regulars are: a) restaurants for which the description explic-
itly states their customers are mainly regulars, b) restaurants for which the
description uses the expression \out of tourist routes" or another equivalent
expression, c) restaurants with some rare speciality. Restaurants which: a)
fall in both previous classes, b) fall in neither of the previous classes, are clas-
si¯ed as Popular Restaurants, a residual category. Thus, we consider as PR
all restaurants which do not have a clear bias towards Tourists or Regulars.
The procedure used to build RR, RT and PR can reasonably be assumed as
exogenous in our empirical analysis. It relies on the exogenous capacity to
attract Tourists rather than on restaurants' strategies.
We also consider the number of stars (which take the values 0,1,2,3 ac-
cording to the quality of cuisine) as a proxy for quality. The dependent
variable is the logarithmic price change for the interval 2002-03.3
Tab. 1 reports descriptive statistics for our sample. ¢P is the logarithmic
di®erence of price. The ¯rst column shows a 3.6% average increase of the
price for the whole sample. The increase, however, has been considerably
higher for those countries which adopted the euro (4.3%) than for the others
3The guide reports a minimum and a maximum price for each restaurant. We only
report the results for the minimum price, which is more informative for the purposes of
our analysis. However, we have also performed tests for the maximum price with virtually
identical outcomes. The results are available upon requests.
11(0.5%). Individual country statistics are reported in Tab. 2. Italy, France
and Germany are far above the average of non-euro countries. Standard
deviations within euro countries are lower than within non-euro countries.
4.2 Estimates
We use OLS to estimate the following model:
¢Pi = ¯0 + ¯1EURORTi + ¯2EURORRi + ¯3EUROPRi +
+¯4STAR1i + ¯5STAR2i + ¯6STAR3i + ui (8)
where EURORT, EURORR, and EUROPR are the products of the dummy
EURO by RT, RR and PR respectively. The coe±cients on these variables
should be interpreted as the additional price changes due to the interaction
of the euro e®ect with the restaurant's capacity to attract tourists. STAR1,
STAR2, and STAR3 are dummies which take the value 1 according to the
number of stars awarded to the individual restaurant by the guide. Including
these variables allows to control for quality.
We use this model to test the key implications of our theoretical model.
Proposition 3 suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis:
H
a
0 : ¯1 = ¯2 = ¯3 = 0 (9)
In fact, ¯1, ¯2, and ¯3 can be interpreted as the di®erences in price change
between euro and non-euro countries. The sum of the three variables exactly
replicates a dummy for euro-countries. The signi¯cance of at least one pa-
rameter would indicate a di®erent rate of in°ation for euro-countries reative
to non-euro-countries. The alternative hypothesis is thus that one or more
parameters are jointly di®erent from zero.
We also test Proposition 4. The null hypothesis in this case is:
H
b
0 : ¯1 = ¯2 (10)
It implies that the e®ect of the changeover is homogeneous among restau-
rants with di®erent types of customers. By contrast, Proposition 4 suggests
that in the presence of a jump the price change is higher for RT than for RR,
while the price change for PR is ambiguous. Thus, the alternative hypothesis
is that RT experienced higher price change than RR:
H
b
1 : ¯1 > ¯2 (11)
We also test the homogeneity between PR on the one hand and RR and
RT on the other.
12A consideration should be made. The guide selects restaurants on the
basis of rigorous quality standards. This implies that our sample is biased
toward quality restaurants. In other words, our sample does not include
tourist traps. This suggests that we grossly underestimate the e®ect of the
changeover.
Results are shown in Tab. 3. The coe±cients of EURORR, EUROPR,
are positive, but not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The coe±cient of
EURORT is remarkably high and implies that tourist restaurants in the euro
area have increased their prices by 6 percentage points more than non-euro
restaurants. The coe±cient for PR (¯3) is between ¯1 and ¯2, as implied by
the theoretical model. The intercept, that should be interpreted as the price
change of non-euro restaurants (with no stars), is not signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero, implying that prices remained roughly constant outside the euro
area.
The bottom part of the Table reports direct tests for our implications.
F1 is an F-test for Ha
0. The null hypothesis of an homogeneous restaurant
behaviour inside and outside the euro area is rejected at 0.1 percent con¯-
dence level. This ¯nding strongly suggests the presence of a jump from a low
to a high price equilibrium after the introduction of the euro.
T1 is a test for the null that the sum of ¯1, ¯2 and ¯3 is equal to zero. The
rejection of the null implies that the dummy EURO has a signi¯cant e®ect
even without discriminating across di®erent types of restaurants. T2,T3, and
T4 are t-tests for the hypothesis of a homogeneous price change across restau-
rants with di®erent customers: ¯1 = ¯2, ¯1 = ¯3, and ¯2 = ¯3 respectively.
F2 is an F-test for the joint hypothesis of homogeneity within restaurants
with di®erent customer-types: ¯1 = ¯2 = ¯3.
The direct test for Hb
0 is thus the one-sided test T2. The main prediction
of Proposition 4 (¯1 > ¯2) is strongly supported by the data in both cases
at 0.1% con¯dence level. The price change for tourist restaurants has been
markedly higher than for restaurants with regular customers. The di®erence
between RT and RR within euro-countries is about 4%.
Additional insights can be obtained by considering T3 and T4. T3 rejects
the null ¯1 = ¯3 while T4 does not reject ¯2 = ¯3. This evidence is consistent
with the model prediction of an ambiguous behaviour of Popular Restaurants
in the presence of a jump.
More surprising is the role of quality. The model predicts that low quality
restaurants are on average more likely to deal only with tourists. By contrast,
Tab. 3 shows that 2 and 3 stars restaurants have increased their prices
signi¯cantly more than the others. However, this e®ect is not conditional on
the introduction of the euro. A joint test for equality of coe±cients inside
and outside the euro area (not reported) could not reject the hypothesis at
13any common level of signi¯cance (the p-value is 0.486). Thus, the e®ect of
top quality restaurants seems to be homogeneous among European countries
regardless of the adoption of the new currency. A possible explanation is
the occurrence of bad weather which caused an increase in food cost within
Europe. Since high quality restaurants tend to consider di®erent varieties
of products as imperfect substitutes, they have a more limited choice of
ingredients than other restaurants. Thus, in the event of an increase in
food price, they are not able to choose those varieties which have been less
a®ected by the weather. Hence, an increase in food cost might have a®ected
top restaurants more than low quality restaurants.
An additional test of the validity of our model has been carried out in
table 4, where results of a \di®erence-in-di®erence" regression are reported.
The estimate of the euro-e®ect is positive and similar in size to table 3. The
average in°ation di®erential between restaurants in the euro and non-euro
areas is about 6.6% for RT which is statistically greater than zero almost at
0.1% signi¯cance level. A direct test for the conditionality of the euro e®ect
to the type of restaurants is T5 which tests whether the in°ation di®erential
between euro and non euro is the same for RR and RT. The null is rejected
at 1% signi¯cance level.4
The results shown are also robust to the introduction of the number of
forks awarded to the individual restaurant. The number of forks (which takes
values 1,2,3,4,5 according to the venue's luxury and comfort) is a quality
indicator more easily observable for customers than the quality of cuisine,
and never results signi¯cant.
5 Conclusions
The introduction of the euro has had in°ationary consequences on the ser-
vice sector and in particular on the catering market. Restaurant prices have
registered marked increases in all countries belonging to the euro zone. Far
from being a neutral monetary reform, the adoption of a common currency
has acted as a coordinating device, shifting the industry to a high-price equi-
librium.
The theoretical predictions of our model of the catering market with
multiplicity of equilibria are strongly supported by empirical evidence based
on data from the Michelin Red Guide. The occurrence of abnormal price
increases in countries belonging to the Euro area con¯rms the validity of our
interpretation against popular alternative explanations such as increases in
costs driven by bad weather.
4We are grateful to Antonio Ciccone for suggesting this test of robustness.
14The marked price increases in restaurants in tourist locations would seem
to indicate the superiority of our theory also over the suggested justi¯cation
in terms of rounding-o® of prices in the new currency or overdue and delayed
adjustment of menus.
The increase in the price of meals should not be regarded as a transitory
blip destined eventually to revert back. Higher prices are here to stay unless
an unlikely massive coordinated boycott by customers takes place.
Impressive as it is, the quantitative relevance of the phenomenon found
in our empirical analysis is surely underestimated. Our results are, in fact,
based on a sample of selected and reliable restaurants. The Michelin Red
Guide is arguably one of the best and most exacting Restaurant guides in
the world, where the truly bad tourist traps would never ¯nd place.
There has been a change in relative prices in Euroland, with possibly
long-lasting redistributional e®ects in favour of the catering sector.
15A Symmetric Equilibria
Let us consider the possible cases:
1. c(xL) < p¤
T · v(xL) < v(xM) < v(xH).
2. c(xL) < v(xL) < p¤
T < v(xM) < v(xH).




It is immediately possible to show that a Tourist will never be in the
case p¤
T < v(xL). Since the lowest possible quality is v(xL), for p¤
T < v(xL)
it always holds p¤
T < E(v(xj)jp¤
T). In other words the Tourist is refusing
too many pro¯table meals and would be better o® with a higher reservation
price. Thus, we can rule out this case. The case p¤
T = v(xL) is a bit more
complex:
Lemma 2. The case p¤
T = v(xL) is a SNE if and only if c(xM) ¸ v(xL).
Proof. Assume c(xM) ¸ v(xL) and assume also that v(xL) 6= E(v(xj)jv(xL))
in presence of p¤
T = v(xL). This can happen only in the case that some
medium or high quality restaurants are selling at p¤
T. But, if c(xM) ¸ v(xL)
they are making non-positive pro¯ts and would be better o® by dealing only
with Locals. Thus, the equality p¤
T = v(xL) = E(v(xj)jv(xL)) must hold.
Assume instead that c(xM) < v(xL), then, by the expression for ¸PR
M there
is a non-zero fraction of medium quality restaurants that is dealing with
tourists. Thus, it must be E(v(xj)jv(xL)) > v(xL) = p¤
T.
Second case: v(xL) < p¤
T < v(xM).
This is a more interesting case. In this case we have that ¸RT
L ¡ ¸ low
quality restaurants become PR (if they set p = v(xL) < p¤
T and ¸ ¡ ¸RT
L
become RT (by setting p = p¤
T > v(xL)). Furthermore, ¸PR
M ¡ ¸ medium
quality restaurants become RR whereas ¸ ¡ ¸PR
M become PR. The same ap-
plies for high quality restaurants. As for the restaurants, the Poisson nature
of the process implies a discounted utility for a Tourist from a restaurant i
of quality j equal to
¸i































H which are just linear transformations of p¤





























T = µa0v(xL) + µa1(v(xM) + v(xH)) +
+µv(xM)(± ln(¸M(p
¤









a0 ´ ¸ ¡ ¸ ¡ ± ln(¸ + ±) + ± ln(¸ + ±)
and
a1 ´ ¸ ¡ ± ln(¸ + ±)
and the right hand side in (A.2) is clearly nonlinear in p¤
T.
Third Case: v(xM) · p¤
T < v(xH) In general, v(xM) = p¤
T is not an
equilibrium unless for particular values of the parameters. Consider what
happens if p¤
T > v(xM). In this case, again ¸RT
L ¡ ¸ low quality restaurants
become PR and ¸ ¡ ¸RT
L become RT. Moreover, ¸RT
M ¡ ¸ medium quality
restaurants become PR and ¸ ¡ ¸RT
M become RT (thus, if the price is high
enough, also medium quality restaurants become RT). Finally, ¸PR
H ¡ ¸ be-
come RR and ¸ ¡ ¸PR
























and, using the same notation as in (A.2), the equilibrium is:
p
¤
T = µa0(v(xM) + v(xL)) + µa1v(xH) +
+µv(xH)(± ln(¸H(p
¤
T) + ±) ¡ ¸H(p
¤
T)) (A.3)
5Note that the cuto®s ¸RT
L and ¸PR
H are di®erent from the previous case since p¤
T is
now higher.
17and, again, the expected quality is nonlinear in the price. When the price
p¤
T which is expected to prevail is lower than v(xM) the relevant function is
that in (A.2). When p¤
T ¸ v(xM) the relationship (A.3) holds.
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19Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All Sample Euro Non Euro
¢P ¢P ¢P
Mean 0.033 0.043 0.005
S.d. 0.161 0.129 0.227
Min -1.374 -0.624 -1.374
Max 0.951 0.951 0.681
Obs. 746 552 194
Notes: ¢P is the logarithmic di®erence of the price between the 2003 and the 2002
editions.

































F1 : F(3;739) 6.06***
p-value (0.000)
F2 : F(2;739) 7.17***
p-value (0.001)
T1 : t739 1.90*
p-value (0.029)
T2 : t739 3.73***
p-value (0.000)
T3 : t739 2.38*
p-value (0.018)
T4 : t739 0.28
p-value (0.784)
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates for Equation (8) with heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors (in parentheses). Number of observations = 746. Tests for the following
hypotheses are reported:
F1: EURORT = EUROPR = EURORR = 0.
F2: EURORT = EUROPR = EURORR.
T1: EURORT + EURORR + EUROPR = 0 against EURORT + EURORR +
EUROPR > 0 (one-sided).
T2: EURORT = EURORR against EURORT > EURORR (one-sided).
T3: EURORT = EUROPR (two-sided).
T4: EUROPR = EURORR (two-sided).
* = 5% signi¯cant. ** = 1% signi¯cant. *** = 0.1% signi¯cant.
22Table 4: Di®erence-in-Di®erence Estimation
Dependent Var.








T5 : t743 3.07**
p-value (0.001)
T6 : t743 6.27***
p-value (0.000)
T7 : t743 3.20**
p-value (0.002)
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates for the following model:
y = °0 + °1RT + °2RR + ²
where y ´ EURO¢P ¡ (1 ¡ EURO)¢P. Heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations = 746. Tests
for the following hypotheses are reported:
T5: RT = RR against RT > RR (one-sided).
T6: RT + cons = 0.
T7: RR + cons = 0.
* = 5% signi¯cant. ** = 1% signi¯cant. *** = 0.1% signi¯cant.
23Figure 1: Multiple Equilibria
The ¯gure shows the possibility of multiple equilibria. It is based on the
following set of parameters:
v(xL) 10 c(xL) 1 ¸ 1
v(xM) 25 c(xM) 5 ¸ 0.3
v(xH) 50 c(xH) 7 ¸ 1
± .8
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